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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the planning of Elizabeth by the South Australian
Housing Trust. As a new town, Elizabeth drew on the planning
assumptions and objectives of the postwar British town planning
movement and represented a specific plagiarization of the empowering
British tradition which dominated Australian planning. In particular, the
planners of Elizabeth assumed that working-class residents could be
'improved' by a proper arrangement of urban space and would not bring
their own spatial creativity to bear upon the community
,
and that the
major employers enticed into locating in the new town would also
conform to the expectations of a harmonious as well as profitable
landscape. Both assumptions were vital in the new town vision, yet
neither had any force outside the planning ideologies themselves. The
building of the city reflected the difficulty of implementing borrowed
templates for the 'good city', especially in terms of 'self-containment' and
'social mix'. Increasingly wary of the unauthorised activities of residents
and doubtful about the means of creating a cohesive and mixed
community, the Trust 's officials instead began to rely heavily on
employers to guarantee the social as well as economic outcomes of the
project . The paper concludes by suggesting that while economic
prosperity and the benefits of Trust planning kept employers loyal to this
accumulation site while providing residents with the means to build a
working community into the early 1970s, the onset of crisis fatally
undermined this version of the 'good city'.
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PLANNING THE GOOD CITY IN AUSTRALIA:
ELIZABETH AS A NEW TOWN
7. Introduction
As Australia’s depressed outer suburbs move back into the political spotlight,
places like Elizabeth will perhaps attract the kind of research that was
neglected as they became disadvantaged. Fringe working-class suburbs have
had some sociology, but precious little history.^ As a planned community,
Elizabeth has done rather better than most in attracting representations. One is
the city bom of intelligent, inventive urban performers in the South Australian
Housing Trust. It is a relatively good urban space, with a tolerable, even
commendable, array of community institutions.^ Another is qualified,
Elizabeth in a minor key, the mixed results of new town principles meeting a
working-class population. ^ Other, less official, Elizabeths emerge from
different sites of cultural production, moulded by print and television
journalism out of popular memories and knowledges. They magnify the city's
physical and social distance from Adelaide and collect the images of social
breakdown at a convenient distance from the bourgeois centre. A "Pommy"
Elizabeth: strange accents, pubs, rampant shop stewards. An Elizabeth of
crime, vandalism and child abuse which teaches what people do when you
pamper them with welfare and public housing. A valiant Elizabeth,
overcoming its long depression and hiding its welfare stigmata behind a new
City Centre and various "SA Great" paraphernalia. An unsavoury Elizabeth,
shaped out of the wash of negative stereotypes, which explains the 'slum'
present as a prior Elizabeth of battlers and good times 'ruined' by the
debilitating 'invasion' of Aboriginals and single mothers.^
Mine is a competing interpretation of the history and significance of this
landscape, 'my Elizabeth', to be held up against other, misleading,
representations. It is a critical history of its planning and development, its
decline under economic crisis during the 1970s, and its future in the
competitive city. This history locates the problems of Elizabeth not in the
inadequate implementation of design, nor in the deficiencies of its residents,
nor in some invasion of the dispossessed, but in the problematic assumptions of
the plan itself and the impact of changing economic imperatives on a working-
class, migrant community. In this paper, I focus on the plan, in which
Elizabeth’s builders plagiarised the British new town as the appropriate model
for the 'good city', the city of community and productive enterprise. As such.
2
Planning the Good City
they incorporated the social strategies and outcomes of new towns, in
particular the expectations that a well-planned urban space would improve
working-class residents and that the town could be both a harmonious
community and a profitable site for private industrial enterprise.
In this sense, the new town model established a 'bargain of expertise' between
the plaimers and their clients: the residents and users of the landscape. The
expert provision of the good city could be maintained and defended only so
long as those clients, especially working-class residents, could be seen to be
improving their spatial and social behaviour to fit the new town's expectations.
As participants in the new town strategy, residents were expected to conform
to and confirm the ideal geography of the plan. Any deviation, any improper
or unauthorised use of space, undermined the bargain. Yet the bargain was
already compromised by two crucial assumptions. First, it assumed that
residents would and could conform to the social objectives of the plan and
would not bring their own spatial creativity and strategies to bear upon the
landscape. Slums and council housing estates had proved that working-class
people were incapable of sustaining proper social relationships and proper uses
of space, even in new housing. An environment planned as integrated
neighbourhoods would guide them into pre-determined social territories and
form them into proper communities. By ensuring 'social balance', the towns
would also contain a middle-class element sufficient to provide examples of the
proper ways to use space, maintain community and perform the tasks of
citizenship.^ Second, it assumed that employers who located in the new town
would be loyal to the plan. New towns promoted and celebrated a particular
kind of capitalism: productive, efficient, progressive. The good city needed
good employers, who would provide jobs and respect the objectives of social
and physical improvement. Planners expected, and located, a morality in
industrial capitalism, a commitment to the good city in the good society.^
Both assumptions were vital in securing support for the new town vision;
neither had any real force outside the planning ideology itself. The good city
was under threat from the moment of its creation because planners expected
certainties where there could be none. Effectively, 'long boom' prosperity
postponed the destabilisation of new town landscapes, including Elizabeth, into
the 1970s. Competing Elizabeths — the Elizabeth imagined by the planners,
the Elizabeth used by employers, and the multiple Elizabeths constructed by
the stratified working-class population — could exist in the same place. But as
economic crisis threatened the foundations of working-class community and
revealed the limits of employer loyalty to place, the good city was stripped
bare and abandoned. The 'bargain of expertise’ had no power to tie employers
down and no explanation of social problems beyond the residents failure to
conform to the rules of the landscape. New Elizabeths of poverty and
alienation emerged, Elizabeths which must now vie for growth opportunities
in the new competitive city, or be managed as social problems by a retreating
public sector.
The first Elizabeth, the Elizabeth prior to all the other constructions of the
landscape, was the good city. This Elizabeth was a plagiarisation of the British
new town. As such, it is a good example of how a derivative practice was
actually implemented in Australia. At Elizabeth, Australian planners decisively
intervened in the production of the urban landscape, albeit through a housing
authority. They turned derived ideas into a landscape. But my aim is not to
dissect their Elizabeth as a discourse. It is more important to understand how
their discourse was turned into material practice. Like any planned site,
Elizabeth was expected to apply and to prove the knowledge which created it.
For all the shining surfaces of planning discourse, and for all the intellectual
pleasure to be gained from playing over them, what matters in the end is that
move to material practice, with all its contradictions and contests.
2. Elizabeth in the Australian Planning Tradition
Where did this first Elizabeth come from? Why did the architects, surveyors
and engineers of the Housing Trust make the good city in the form of a British
new town? Like most Australian planners before and after the Second World
War, they took their models from British planning and reform. The British
example also sustained their claims as possessors of powerful knowledge.
Certainly, Australian town planning was never an exclusively professional
practice. Urban reformers, engineers, public servants and amateurs always
played a role in foiming policy. Tliis was, as Stretton argues, particularly true
of the Housing Trust.^ But they were all 'planners', and they all took from
Britain the tools of improvement and the arguments for their use in shaping a
better urban future, in whichever city they intended to apply them. Within this
derivative tradition, the new town emerged as one template for the good city;
it was taken up by South Australian planners because it was a distinctive and
better choice from the range of derivative possibilities. Adelaide's planning
advocates preferred their plagiarisations direct, not refracted through the
reformist activisms of Sydney or Melbourne.^ In the particular context of the
1940s and 1950s, their determination to produce a distinctive regional strategy
for urban development made the new town an attractive and compelling
option.
Australian planning had always relied on British models. Its Britishness
intensified, if anything, in anticipation of planned reconstruction after the First
World War. Wartime dedication to the mother country tied planners even
more securely to imperial visions of the race restored by garden cities; "[i]f we
are to hold our own in the world as an Imperial race, we must ruthlessly
remove the slum and create the garden village. Australians looked to their
British counterparts for ideas about how to reform and how to claim power.
Ironically, a town planning movement that frequently bemoaned its
marginalisation in Britain was celebrated in Australia as the proven example of
effective social and environmental activism. Actual English achievement was
less important than the imagined English facility for providing solutions that
could be applauded and applied across the imperial domain. At this time,
Australian planners borrowed more than a belief in the garden city. They also
borrowed an identification and interpretation of social problems rooted in the
British experience of urban blight. Their imagination was based on English
landscapes and implemented on cities transposed into colonial versions of the
East End. They looked for Stepney and Limehouse and tried to build
Letchworth and Port Sunlight. Achievement was limited to a few garden
suburbs and town plaiming schemes. But their untested assumptions about the
need for the good city in Australia, and about how it might be created,
remained to shape the next bout of intervention in urban sites during the
1940s.
The strident imperialism of these early planners gradually gave way to a less
florid and more technical appreciation of English models during the 1930s,
and Australians looked at Russian and French ideas as well as English garden
city plans. A commitment to redistribution and a critique of private enterprise
gave the idealism of 'planning for life’ a harder edge towards the end of the
Second World War. Though they lacked the widespread destruction of the
urban fabric that freed British planners to advocate wholesale rebuilding,
Australian reformers like F.Oswald Barnett and W.O.Burt could still speak of
an unparalleled social intervention, of a determination to "reconstruct on lines
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that shall be planned, and equitable, and efficient, and beautiful.
"12 Drawing
on their own prewar investigations of slum life and inequitable cities, as well
as the experiences of the first housing commissions, they criticized local
councils and authorities for their jealous defence of piecemeal powers, praised
Russian town planning for its positive approach, and argued that governments
faced a clear choice: "[w]e must plan — or perish.
These reformers were not, of course, creating a problem out of nothing. The
extent of the housing problem in 1945 is well-documented, and the war had
only magnified the gains of speculators and slumlords. Key people in
government agreed with the need for some kind of planned reconstruction
which would prevent a new depression or a repeat of the half-hearted
measures of 1918. The Departments of Post-War Reconstruction and National
Development designed national-level projects and carried out a 'stock-taking’
of housing and infrastructural needs. But the most promising federal
response was the Housing Commission Report of 1944, which proposed
coordinated efforts in public and private enterprise building, a Commonwealth
Housing Authority to advise and coordinate state housing authorities,
controlled subdivision and zoning regulations, participatory planning and land
nationalization.^^ Property interests. Treasury conservatism and a 'housing
first' policy made sure that the subsequent Commonwealth-State Housing
Agreement of 1945 merely provided federal funds for public housing
construction by the states, albeit means-tested to direct funding to the poor,
without any significant extension of Commonwealth powers over town
planning and land use. This particular 'new order' never got off the ground.
At state and local levels, plans for a reconstructed Australia also emerged, with
the enthusiastic participation of town planners, who could often exert more
influence on citywide committees and boards than on government agencies in
Canberra. Most cities undertook housing surveys along with town plans for
redevelopment and urban extension. Sydney developed its County of
Cumberland Plan, while Victorian planners provided for rapid planned growth
in their visions of a Greater Melbourne. Whether in metropolitan authorities,
government departments, universities or town planning committees, planning
advocates gained for the first time a level of legislative support which they
could use to implement planning initiatives beyond simple zoning and
coordinating functions. For a few energetic years, reconstruction governments
in Australia and Britain offered planners the chance to transform their mixed
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heritage of utopian radicalism and architectural determinism into a powerful
material practice. In the end, pent-up housing demand helped defeat careful
control over new developments and planners were also frustrated by the
compromises of the planning process in the absence of controls over land
ownership. For all the enthusiasm of reconstruction, they often spoke in the
weary tones of re-inventing the wheel. Town planning, it seemed to them, was
too often 'rediscovered' at times of national need, only to be reshelved when
property interests and do-nothing governments were able to go back to the
more normal pattern of decision-making about Australia's urban places.
Throughout the period, the identification of what was to be done remained
strongly British. As Robert Freestone notes, pre-war channels for English
ideas remained intact, and a "more decisive anglicising force in the early post-
war period was the appointment of many British-trained people to positions of
influence within government and academia. The cementing of the Pacific
alliance and the waning of the British Empire in Asia did not lead to any
retreat from British models. They may have looked at 'prairie planning', even
at le Corbusier, but most Australian planners maintained their devotion to
British practices and examples. An England of Attlee made for a stronger
connection, if anything. Even as they criticised urban sprawl, Australia's town
planners focused on the slum as the greater threat. Even as they noted the
decline of country towns and entire rural regions, they turned to satellite
development as the solution to overconcentration. And even as they talked of
the problems of ribbon development and soulless housing estates, they thought
of British new towns and garden suburbs as the given physical forms of the
better society. It was in English terms, indeed often in England itself, that
Australian planners learned to read slums, anomie and immoral geographies.
They would also learn how to draw the physical structures that would force
slum dwellers, developers, and even their employers, into more proper uses of
urban space.
During the 1940s, then, the basic concepts of British design were cemented in
Australian planning ideology and practice. The garden city idea was already in
place, having been employed since at least the First World War as the template
for well-ordered and pleasant urban design. Added to it now were
neighbourhood units and new towns. The neighbourhood unit, which
borrowed from English models and in turn American ideas, was a simple,
compact description of how people should live. Its Australian advocates simply
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repeated the adages of the English planners that a top-down reconstruction or
creation of neighbourhoods would work and that the village or small town
provided the ideal model for social relations .21 Walter Running suggested that
"[c]ontemporary town planners and sociologists seek to create the small town
community spirit within the great metropolitan area ... [by] sorting out the
numerous small communities which exist within the city, [and] helping to
restore their identity and individuality by separating their boundaries’’.^^
Planners could simply say ”it has been found that”, or ’’overseas experience
shows”, even though some English critics were already questioning the
feasibility of neighbourhood creation. 23 Rut Running and other Australian
practitioners could move quickly and easily to the problems of
implementation, secure in the Rritishness of the explanations. Very little debate
attended these incorporations, indicating how far the arguments about them
remained in England even as the ideas and their determining assumptions made
the trip out to Australia.
The other model considered by Australian planners was the new town. Most
were ambivalent about this idea, generally endorsing satellite development but
remaining unsure of the profitability or feasibility of entirely new cities.
Running, for instance, did consider new towns to be an ultimate goal, but he
did not want to restrict planners to such large-scale projects. His own new
town design drew equally on Ebenezer Howard and le Corbusier, but it picked
up neither self-containment nor social mix, key aspects of the new town
ideology. 24 For their part, Rarnett and Rurt warned against simplistic
rehousing policies where autliorities expected to ’’just buy hundreds of acres on
the outskirts of the city, build thousands of houses, and the houseless worker
and the dweller in slums will immediately rush out to the new homes, the
slums will disappear overnight, and all our housing problems will be
solved. ”25 They preferred to reconstruct Richmond, not simply abandon it.
The new town did have its Australian advocates, but few were at the forefront
of postwar planning. After 1950, the exampie of the Rritish new towns was
waved about energetically at planning congresses and in planning journals. The
1951 Federal Congress on Regional and Town Planning heard papers which
endorsed new towns while severely criticising Canberra as ”[a] garden without
a city”.26 Rut most participants were more interested in regional planning than
in new towns. In 1951, A.A.Heath and R.N.Hewison launched their ’’First Six
New Cities (Australia) Movement”, announcing it in the Rritish journal Town
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and Country Planning.^'^ They proposed a direct link between migration and
town planning and argued for a transfer of population "from over-crowded
areas of the United Kingdom to suitable sites in the Dominions". 28 Most
professional planners were happy to concede that new towns were the best and
most efficient landscape for modem living. But they did not opt at first for
British-style new town development. The relative standards of slum housing
stock in the two countries, the lack of wartime devastation in Australian cities,
and the failure of the Commonwealth to implement the policy of land
collection suggested by the 1944 Housing Commission influenced their
position. Also, many already had a fear of sprawl and were ambivalent about
simply adding on satellite towns without significantly enhanced federal or state
powers to protect green belts and control the location of industry. Ironically,
this meant new town advocates in Australia were even more reliant on English
rhetoric and interpretation in advancing their cause.29
Only South Australia made full steam ahead with new town development, and
then belatedly. In his celebratory article on the founding of Elizabeth, architect
Peter Harrison offered one explanation as to why:
It was to be expected that Australia, with problems of city planning in some ways even
more pressing than those of English cities, should have caught on to the idea. Sydney
and Melbourne are convincing demonstrations of the price of gigantism; both are
struggling with planning schemes aimed to make these places more fit for human use
but neither has come forward with concrete proposals for new towns to relieve the
increasing pressure on their over-burdened metropolitan areas. Adelaide, profiting
perhaps from these examples and aiming to avoid similar difficulties, has started a
New Town, not so much as the outcome of a State policy of decentralisation but as the
result of the uncommon common sense of the South Australian Housing Trust.^^
"Uncommon common sense", perhaps even the Trust's very distance from
professional planners and normal government procedures, allowed South
Australia to erect the best example of visionary urban planning. South
Australia made the running because the people who created its housing
authority "unlearned most of the conventional wisdom of the day . . . and
replaced it by a half-page logic of their own: local, ruthless, simple, new.
"5'
While most have explained Elizabeth's development this way, it is important to
place the decision to build Elizabeth in the wider context of Australian
planning ideas. As a derivative practice, Australian planning clung limpet-like
to the changing interpretations of English planning. Tlie Trust's 'common
sense' was conceivably a specific plagiarism of that empowering British
tradition, the use of a particular derived model to suit its particular economic
and social aims. Granted it was fiddled with here and there, but this was
basically Stevenage on the Adelaide Plains. Not even Stevenage, but a rather
hazy image of the British new town, stripped of the precise administrative
practices demanded by British legal and legislative requirements. The Trust
did not so much import a working model as various bits of its machinery, a
description of its apparent purpose, and a set of more or less detailed
instructions.
Adelaide likes the idea that it is at the cutting edge of progressive town
planning, that other states have much to learn from what goes on there, even
that Colonel Light taught tlie British a thing or two.^^ Yet the language and
practices of this 'peculiar' activism are distinctly English. Early garden suburb
planning, for instance, was dominated by Charles Reade, whose English
origins (and intellectual baggage) were impeccable.
A
garden suburb and
some town planning schemes aside, this early planning activism could not
sustain comprehensive planning powers, especially in the face of conservative
landholders who dominated the Upper House in South Australia. The next
surge of activity awaited the realisation that planning was not just good
reform, but good business too. Tlie economic revitalization strategy developed
by J.W.Wainwright, Premier Butler and eventually Premier Playford in the
1930s seized on the notion of planning as a source of economic advantage. The
"Playford Plan" aimed to shift South Australia away from its reliance on
primary industry and make it into a manufacturing region. The South
Australian Housing Trust, created as a statutory authority in 1936, provided
the cheap housing arm of the low wages/low costs industrialisation policy.
This strategy of state-supported accumulation was rarely in serious dispute in
South Australia.35 But the precise functions and powers of the Trust were left
for its managers and other senior public servants to work out as they went
along. It was restricted at first by cost limitations and the ambiguities of its
status as an independent statutory authority deriving its funds from Treasury
loans. 36 With the crucial support of incoming Premier Playford, the Trust
seized the initiative after 1938, eventually becoming a de facto state
development authority and even a migration agency under the leadership of
Horace Hogben and Alex Symons, whose work was then extended by
J.P.Cartledge and Alex Ramsay. Skilfully using the economic benefits of state
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support to explain and legitimise further public sector activity, they were able
to win endorsement for positive planning from a surprising cross-section of
South Australians: urban and country politicians, industrialists, and
landowners. As a tool of the parochial industrialisation policy. South
Australian public housing could rely on a coalition unlike any other in
Australia.
The Trust's leaders, in tandem with Playford, made it into the most powerful
housing authority in the country. They secured two key pieces of legislation
which sealed its transformation into an operational rather than simply statutory
planning agency. The 1940 Housing Improvement Act allowed the Trust to
build, sell, buy or repair any kind of building, including houses for higher-
paid skilled workers, and to purchase large amounts of land in anticipation of
future housing needs. The Trust could now use its purchasing and building
powers to develop large, mixed housing estates and compete effectively with
private developers in land and housing markets. The 1941 Homes Act,
meanwhile, provided State Bank loans to wage earners for purchasing new
homes from the Trust.^^ All along, Playford made sure that the money kept
coming from state loans and grants or semi-government borrowings.
It was after the war, especially, that Trust officials began to assert their
differences from the other housing authorities. They decided, with Playford's
support, to opt out of the 1945 Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement
because it imposed means tests on the use of federal monies, which would
threaten the building of houses for sale. The decision indicated the Trust's
sense of its peculiar role. Its mission was housing the worker, not the slum
dweller, and its tactic was using sale housing to discipline land and housing
markets while generating funds for rental construction. State development
demanded cheap housing for workers and a hierarchy of house types, not
simply homes for the poor. And that made the new town strategy a
particularly inviting option.
So, in explaining why it was the Housing Trust that built Australia s first real
new town, this mission is most important, along with factors such as the
exhaustion of land supply in inner Adelaide and the need to concentrate
construction in cost-efficient large estates. Basically, the new town was a
good fit with the Trust's distinctive objectives. It was a useful, and available,
model of the 'good' city which would also promote industrial growth for the
region as a whole. It provided a landscape for the worker, rather than simply
for the poor. Ramsay, the intellectual heart of the Trust in the late 1940s and
1950s, occasionally mentioned slum dwellers in his proposals for satellite
development, but was generally more concerned with "suitable persons" whose
problem was as much housing scarcity as housing cost. Acknowledging the
work of reformers like Barnett and Burt, Ramsay nonetheless considered that
"the swing has been, if anything, too great; from the acceptance of slums to the
refrigerator-in-every-house school of thought. He preferred a more
conservative and a more effective kind of activism: build houses for those that
could afford them and use the profits to supply spartan rental homes at low
cost. Garden city ideology had always stressed the importance of providing a
range of house types for a range of social groups. The new town movement
strengthened the planning rationale and the social justification for a hierarchy
of housing types and for public sector investment in private property.
New towns also promised to overcome urban sprawl. Unplanned urban
extension was expensive and inefficient, and controlling such costs, especially
in terms of public services, was a major impetus for Trust activity in the
1950s. The new town accorded with its evolving strategy to discipline land and
housing markets and prevent unchecked development. It showed the way
forward: increased suburbanisation, without sprawl, at the behest of a 'bold
and decisive' planning and development agency. It showed how operational, as
opposed to statutory, planning gave a housing authority the power to construct
entire landscapes, gathering land and controlling its sale, lease and use. The
new town was comprehensive, positive planning on the grand scale, and stood
in compelling opposition to piecemeal inteiwention, whether refurbished slums
or ribbon development along roads and railways. That the model was British
made it even more useful in deflecting complaints that the Trust was engaged
in some kind of creeping state socialism.
New towns were also economic projects. They would attract new industries or
help decentralize and invigorate old ones. Playford secured another key piece
of enabling legislation in a 1950 Amendment to the 1940 Housing
Improvement Act which allowed the Trust to purchase land for uses other than
house building. The Trust could now act like a British new town development
corporation, building a whole community: factories, open space, shops and
civic buildings as well as homes. The new town also promised to fulfil one
other important objective: cost efficiency. Their experience in finding land and
12
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building houses in Adelaide before 1945, and their reading of the financial
justifications of the British new towns, convinced Trust planners that only
large estates with a mix of rental and sales housing were financially viable and
politically attractive. In particular, they took from their studies of Britain the
need to build facilities — including worksites — around the houses, not vice
versa.
The Trust did intermittently register its reliance on the English planning
movement. By the mid-1950s, the Housing Trust 'tour of the English new
towns was well-established. Geoff Shedley, the major architect, and Vic
Barrel!, the manager of rental estates, did the tour in 1954, and they were
followed by engineer-planner H.E.S. Melbourne in 1956. Barrell suggested to
Melbourne that he visit Harlow, Crawley, Stevenage, Hemel Hempstead,
Welwyn, Letchworth and Cwmbran, the latter especially because "we have
copies of their plans and have discussed their ideas".42 As Ramsay noted in
1956, "[i]n addition to the Trust's practical experience of all aspects of housing
in city and country, the best theoretical and technical knowledge has been
devoted to the task".^^ Australian know-how, with overseas theory, would
guarantee good design.
The actual planning of Elizabeth involved a large number of the Trust's staff.
Small planning groups dealt with particular parts of the design, but the overall
direction was supplied by Henry Smith (a planner) and two engineers: H.E.S.
Melbourne and G.E.Stolz. Ramsay, as General Manager, provided publicity,
ideas and support and ensured that the project remained visible as a key
component of the 'Playford Plan'.44 For all that, the planning of Elizabeth was
not, from the evidence of the records, a particularly self-conscious planning
process. If there were extended discussions of motivation, philosophy or social
ideology, they were not written down. Perhaps the small planning groups and
the senior officials practiced a largely oral administrative and decision-making
culture, but it seems also that they assumed no need to record any ongoing
deliberations over the plan. Only in Annual Reports to the Parliament was
there any attempt to provide basic planning philosophy, and even these offered
confusing shifts in basic definitions and concepts. Elizabeth was a project based
on fitting a set of designs together, in a context of broadly held but loosely
defined social objectives.
Planning the Good City
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The decision to build Elizabeth was therefore a decision to build a British new
town in Australia. On one level, this meant a particular kind of urban
development, using new town design to suit the Tlayford’ strategy of cheap
housing, industrialization and economic advantage. But it also meant that
Elizabeth was constructed from pre-emptive, closed images of what constituted
the good city. It would have a geography to improve its residents by means of
neighbourhood reconstruction and a village-like arrangement of space. The
Trust's use of the new town as a means of economic advancement carried with
it the expectation that their bold intervention in urban growth would fulfill
these vague but still important objectives of social progress as well. And that
meant Elizabeth would incorporate the troublesome assumptions of the new
town as a strategy for urban life: that residents and users could be shaped by
the plan and would do nothing to conflict with the planners' landscape or
threaten their social and economic imperatives.
The Trust did pursue a kind of urban determinism at Elizabeth. It was not a
strictly capitalist one, for it attempted to discipline industry as well as workers.
Nor was it simply a pragmatic use of state monies to build houses for as many
working people as possible, for that did not fulfill the Trust's perception of
itself as a community-building agency. Its objective in Elizabeth was to make a
home for workers. That meant, in part, providing them with a determining
and closed living space, laying down rules in the landscape and trying to make
them work. And what it laid down was what it derived from a planning
tradition it occasionally questioned but never broke away from. But it was not
derivativeness that made the plan untenable; it would be foolish to expect or
want Australian planning to exist in isolation. Rather, Trust planners shared
with their British counterparts the crucial belief that there would be a single
and inevitable relation between what the plan said and what its human objects
did. All along, Elizabeth's planners, as they copied the British experts busy at
Stevenage and Crawley, forgot that plans can neither dictate nor encompass the
lived space of real people.^^
3, "Balanced, Happy Social Groups": Laying out the Good City
"Balanced happy social groups" were what Alex Ramsay defined as the product
of effective 'instant towns'. But actually laying out the new town meant
deciding what spatial rules would dictate balance and happiness, as well as
economic success. It also meant working out, at least in part, what the criteria
14
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for the success of such objectives were. When, and how, would Elizabeth
become the model community it was designed to be? Following British plans
closely, the Trust’s architects and engineers assumed that self-containment and
social balance were the proper ends of the design effort. ITieir benefits were
assumed to be self-evident, in part from their perceived success in Britain but
mostly because they were axiomatic as positive social objectives. Self-
containment tied residents and employers to an uplifting and improving
landscape. Social balance meant that the landscape would not be shaped by the
deficient geographies of workers, but would reflect a proper, middle-class use
of space. What is most surprising in the published and unpublished papers of
Trust officers is how far these concepts were beyond question.
Yet unquestioned concepts did not lead easily to design and implementation.
Self-containment, for example, had a somewhat uneven progress in the Trust's
deliberations on the new town. ’Flexibility' often looked more like confusion.
At first, some described Elizabeth as a satellite of Adelaide. That meant
commuting and economic interdependence. But others were not so sure and
talked about the town’s eventual political or economic independence. The 1950
Annual Report noted of new towns that "if they are not merely to be
’dormitory suburbs’ [they] require some reason for their existence and this
must ordinarily be provided by a hard core of industrial or commercial
development. The town must, in fact, be to a large extent self-sufficient.
This was good planning logic, and securely within the new town planning
tradition. But self-sufficiency was quite a step from ’satellite’. In 1957, Kevin
Phillips, the Trust officer responsible for industrial promotion, came up with a
rather different version of the planning process:
This original planning was based on the thought that ELIZABETH could, or w'ould,
be a satellite of Adelaide where the inhabitants would commute for their employment,
but, subsequently, we learned of industry's interest in ELIZABETH as a place for a
manufacturing centre and the plan during 1956 was enlarged to take care of this new
conception."^^
A 1957 booklet from the General Sales and Promotions Office added that the
Trust "developed a plan for a future City which was to be a centre of life for
its inhabitants and not an extension of city of Adelaide."'*’ So Elizabeth was to
be a self-contained new town, not a satellite, largely because the Trust had
managed to secure large industries (and especially General Motors-1 lolden) tor
the site.
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But the Trust's officers and planners were never sure what successful self-
containment actually looked like. They had to bend and twist concepts like
'satellite' and 'self-contained'. In 1958, the Annual Report stated that "the
Trust's intention from the beginning has been to ensure that Elizabeth shall be
a truly self-contained development, not a mere suburban extension of the
capital city. "5° One year later, something of a change: "[a] basic conception of
Elizabeth was, firstly, to provide housing associated with industry in the
locality and, secondly, to provide housing for Adelaide workers, particularly
those employed in the northern industrial areas. ”5' This discovery and
justification of a commuter housing role seems to have come from the need to
defend the new town against media charges of insufficient employment.
Cartledge responded in this vein to an article in the Sydney Sun in 1959:
The South Australian Housing Trust strenuously objects to the article in the "Sun” of
3rd June in which it is stated that Elizabeth in South Australia is facing disaster. The
complaints upon which the "Sun" article is based apparently came from a very small
number of dissatisfied migrants wishing to return to the U.K....As stated in your
paper, the complaint was that some people must find work in Adelaide owing to the
lack of jobs in Elizabeth. The basic conception of Elizabeth was, firstly, to provide
housing associated with industry in the locality and, secondly, to provide housing for
Adelaide workers, particularly for those employed in the northern industrial areas.
Critics have chosen to overlook the second deliberate and stated purpose of the
Trust.^2
This ’’second deliberate and stated purpose” was actually rather new. Critics
could have found it in previous statements, but they would have found just as
many denials that a commuting population was ever intended at Elizabeth. The
confusion over this basic goal continued into the 1960s. In 1964, Ramsay was
still claiming in a letter to an academic that ”[i]n spite of its proximity to
Adelaide, the new town was planned not as a domiitory suburb of the city of
Adelaide, but as a self-contained community providing housing, employment,
entertainment, education, hospitalization, culture, and in fact providing for
every aspect of community life.”^^
Despite its technical elegance, self-containment proved hard to articulate and
harder still to measure. Any success — like employing twenty more local
residents — could be interpreted as meaning the eventual success of the entire
concept. Any failure — like the frequent tardiness of employers in actually
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starting operations did not so much undermine the concept as push planners
and administrators into occasional retreats, which were in turn abandoned once
things had quietened down. Problems with self-containment were problems of
other people's misinterpretations or lack of commitment — whingeing Pom
migrants were always a handy target in this regard — not problems embedded
in the objective itself. What some may want to see as praiseworthy flexibility
can just as easily be interpreted as a continual groping for justifications for
inadequately theorised and confused social and spatial objectives. And yet the
Trust was shaping a landscape with these objectives. Local employment and
self-containment versus commuting and economic dependence on Adelaide
were hardly academic problems for residents.
As with self-containment, retrospect makes the decision to construct Elizabeth
as a city of socially balanced neighbourhood units look a lot clearer than it
actually was. Henry Smith said he used "the now widely accepted
"Neighbourhood" theory as exemplified by Ebenezer Howard in his garden
city developments at Letchworth and Welwyn in Great Britain. But
planning a neighbourhood-based community for Elizabeth was in fact marked
by a high degree of uncertainty. A space segregated into 'natural'
neighbourhoods was clearly a better space than a polyglot mix of housing,
open space, shops and factories. Segregated neighbourhood units could be
drawn fairly easily, following rules of size and internal structure — including
using the primary school as a centering institution — borrowed from British
plans. But working out ways of integrating them and restricting them to an
optimum size proved difficult. What emerged eventually was a design based on
separate neighbourhoods of various sizes, basically self-sufficient in shops and
primary schools, with the idea that there would be a balance between different
kinds of housing and people within and between the neighbourhood units.
But what precisely did planners mean by 'balance'? They could easily describe
its absence: imbalance meant one-class housing estates, the kinds of landscapes
demonised as 'soulless' and 'destructive of community life' in the new town
literature. But planning for balance rested on some ambiguous definitions. It
sometimes meant a kind of local self-containment, measured simply by
population and access to shops and other services. Or it could be a balance
between social groups within the town, so that the community as a whole
contained a representative sample of the Australian class structure.
Alternatively, it sometimes meant a balance within each neighbourhood, so that
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each unit' would become a microcosm of society. At that level, social balance
often blended into social mix, the idea that within each balanced
neighbourhood unit residents of various classes would mix in integrating
institutions like schools and community centres.^^ Taking that a step further
might even mean actually 'mixing' residents by building different types of
houses next to each other.
The Trust's planners and architects shifted unevenly between these various
models. The 1955 Annual Report noted only that "tlie built-up area has been
planned as six "neighbourhoods", each of which, though contiguous and not
necessarily divided in any way from the others, will be to some extent self-
sufficient as regards the immediate domestic needs of daily life".^^ The 1957
Annual Report spoke of the "division" of the city into a "a number of
neighbourhoods", while in 1958, the units take on a rather passive character,
with the expectation that community integration would occur as "the
'neighbourhoods' or localities developed". By 1966, the Annual Report
suggested that "[e]ach neighbourhood unit is virtually a separate entity. ..[but
the) overall picture of Elizabeth does not. ..present one of patched
development, but rather the result of detailed planning and construction under
the control of the Trust, facilitating integrated development in all aspects of
civic and industrial growth. Neighbourhood segregation, then, gradually
appeared as a foremost goal. But as with self-containment, how far and in what
ways Elizabeth should be a city of balanced and segregated neighbourhoods
emerges from the record as a series of reactive decisions, off the cuff
justifications and intellectual confusions.
So what was expected to go on inside these segregated neighbourhoods?
Community integration, apparently, through some kind of segregated
interaction. Such social outcomes were rarely articulated or defined in any
rigourous way. Perhaps Stuart Hart came closest to retrospectively laying out
what was expected of residents:
Some of us have been sceptical of the theory of planning a new town on the
neighbourhood principle, the neighbourhood being a community of five to ten
thousand people and served with its own primary school, shops and other community
buildings. Perhaps many of us don't find our friends just around the corner. We may
travel many miles to visit friends who have the same likes and dislikes. Similarly, we
may travel many miles to a tennis club or to a church of our own choosing. Most
people, however, prefer to devote their energies to activities in their ow'n district or
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neighbourhocxl. The womenfolk in particular appreciate meeting friends and
neighbours at the shopping centre. Shopping, after all, is one of the most imponant
social occasions in the 9-5 male-less suburbs. The neighbourhood also creates civic
pride, and a unity of purpose. This is most important in a town such as Elizabeth,
where people of all nationalities are settling in an area with no traditions and no
leaders.^’^
While the restricted neighbourhood is clearly inappropriate for those with cars
and tennis clubs, it is perfect for the "most people" inhabiting neighbourhoods
sans tennis clubs. The environment is all: it is not people who have traditions,
leaders or civic pride, it is neighbourhoods' which produce these things.
While the men are working, their unemployed and gregarious wives will build
networks, devoting their energies to community creation and in time
confirming the spatial units laid down by the planners as purposeful
communities. WTiether those units hold five thousand or ten thousand residents
is immaterial. It is the strength of the boundaries, not the size of the
population, which matters most. It was on such assumptions that
neighbourhood unit 'theory' and design practice was based. Hart's description
of how ti. neighbourhood serves "most people" is not peculiar for its naive
and offensive assumption of the purely spatial determination of working-class
communities. It is peculiar for having stated that assumption at all. The
cheerfully segregated groups of residents who appear in other places are not
even granted the dignity of a process. Tney simply happen.
Another possible outcome of neighbourhood balance was some variety of
social mix. The planners seemed to slide from social balance into social mix,
assuming that balance within each neighbourhood would lead somehow to a
degree of mixing in community institutions. But social mix did not imply the
promiscuous intermingling of 'different' kinds of people, and there would be a
definite hierarchy of housing types and housing locations. Tlie site happily
provided an opportune means of such separation. A flat plain for rental
housing and "enough high country to provide a better class residential area as
the town developed" meant that the new town could replicate Adelaide’s
association between elevation (however slight) and class location. From the
beginning, this was to be a balanced and stratified community. Social mix
would go hand in hand with social distinction and the creation of social
leadership.
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Arguably, social mix theory remains tied to such expectations today. Even
with the paternalistic tone subdued, it struggles to overcome a number of
obvious contradictions, most notably between private ownership and the
balanced street or balanced neighbourhood. Mix means 'balance' with
stratification. Elizabeth's planners certainly understood social balance in
precisely this way: a balanced city meant a city of distinct spaces for different
kinds of residents who would come together in public but rarely in private
space. As in Britain, this was justified in terms of the 'natural' tendencies of a
segregated population. The sales and promotions staff assured would-be
residents in 1957 that the Trust "has always understood that its duty is not
merely to provide as many houses as possible but to cater for the needs of the
people in the diversification of type, sale price, rental and estate
management. "^2 Those at the bottom would be well aware of just whose
'diversity' was being protected. Social mix then and now was not intended to
force the middle class to abandon any of its means of excluding undesirables
from its homes, its schools, its occupations or its public spaces. To claim
'social mix' as part of an attack on class distinctions is to seriously misconstrue
its social purposes.
Planners were, however, faced with the problem of actually designing and
achieving a stratified social mix. In Elizabeth, a chief means was building sales
as well as rental houses. Houses for sale were built along with the first rental
double units and continued to be a major part of the building program, despite
a consistent over-supply. Eager to sell them and thus to satisfy the objective of
social balance, the Trust resorted to various strategies. One was to get
employers to recognise the benefits of segregation in living space to match
segregation in work space. Companies could purchase better-quality homes for
their higher-rank employees, or could direct those employees to the Trust's
sales officer. The Trust's estates officers always had a fine eye for such
distinctions. A marginal note to a letter from an employer requesting special
consideration in housing supervisory workers states that "1 asked for this so
there would be no chance of housing next door to below supervisory
personnel.
Selling houses was a way of raising funds to build more rental homes. Tliis
was a key Trust strategy: rather than sell-off rental homes like other housing
authorities, they kept their sales and rental construction programs distinct,
financing the former out of state loans while using funds from the renegotiated
20
Planning the Good City
Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement of 1956 to add to the rental stock.64
But in Elizabeth, selling houses was also a way of creating necessary and
healthy social distinctions within what was always going to be a mostly
working-class area. The argument that a mix of houses was 'economic' and
would save the area from being stigmatized as a one-class estate appeared later.
It does not explain why the hierarchy of house types had to so closely match
the hierarchy of class. What is economic in housing provision is always a
function of what is socially desirable or 'given'. And the given in Elizabeth
was that only spatial hierarchy would give the town the middle class influence
its renting population needed if they were to learn to use the space properly.
The plan incorporated the principle of a hierarchical balance in other ways.
The neighbourhood units, for all of their superficial similarity and
monotonous appearance, differed in one important respect: the proportion of
rental housing. This depended on how close they were to industrial areas and
how far they were from the middle-class hill slopes. In the first
neighbourhoods, the proportion of rental houses, mostly semi-detached,
ranged from 74 per cent in Elizabeth South, furthest from the hill face and
closest to the main factory area, to 43 per cent in Elizabeth Vale, with its
southerly exposure to parks and the Little Para River. The later additions of
Elizabeth West and Elizabeth Field, close to the northern industrial area, were
dominated by the double-unit rental houses: in the West, 76 per cent of the
stock was of this type.^^ Extensions up the hill face in the Park, the Downs, the
East and at Hillbank were almost entirely detached houses for sale. Effectively,
the Trust sabotaged its own idea about socially similar neighbourhood units,
falling back on a supposedly balanced city as good enough. But nowhere was
the significance of such alterations to the objective of social balance or mix
considered.
At the same time, each neighbourhood also had a stratified housing pattern.
This was by now established Trust practice, but at the virgin site of Elizabeth
the process could be achieved without any of the practical difficulties of
building within the established urban area.^^ At all times, the main
thoroughfares were lined with single homes, often for sale, so that the vista
presented to the passing motorist was one of decent suburban homes, not
public housing. The semi-detached rental houses were built in groups along
crescents, courts and dog-legged roads that no passing motorist would need to
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navigate. Renters lived in compact groups, contained and surrounded by a ring
of wagons in the form of better residences.
It could be argued that the double units were built in a solid mass because that
made for economies of construction. But, again, what is economic can only
stem from what is seen as desirable and proper. And what was desirable in
Elizabeth was balance without cheek-by-jowl, mix without actual mixing. How
mix was actually meant to work in this context was never made clear, though it
remained a stated objective of the plan. Ramsay offered one version of how the
hierarchy of housing types might work:
[We] made the rental houses not unattractive but very modest, and as they are basically
in the industrial areas it is usually found that when the family moves up the social scale
the attitude is, ”lt is about time we moved somewhere else, to be among right-thinking
people”. This idea of making sure that these rented properties are not mansions does
have that effect. It makes sure that these people just do not camp in low-rental houses
all their lives.
Residents were apparently expected to understand such social cues. In fact,
they almost immediately interpreted and used these distinctions in rather
different ways from those intended by the Trust. This does not indicate that the
Trust had no social prerogatives. Nor does it show that Elizabeth's planners
made no assumptions about what moral functions 'balanced communities' were
supposed to serve. But they would be continually surprised by the way the
inhabitants of their landscape could shape it despite the guarantee of good
design. And having never really thought about how good design would force
people into particular patterns of interaction or mobility, beyond assuming that
everyone shared their yearning for an idealised British community, they had to
expect that the combination of adequate planning and 'natural' social tendencies
in a village-like landscape would lead to some sort of fulfillment somewhere
down the track.
Despite misgivings about how space was being used, the closed spaces of the
neighbourhood units, the polarization of land uses, and the hierarchy of houses
and streets were at least a triumph for order over the chaos of promiscuous
urban space. In common with other new town plans, Elizabeth stressed
boundaries, not the more tenuous, less easily plotted centres. It is a classed
landscape, of separated and unequal spaces and of carefully delineated divisions
between types of housing and the types of residents expected to inhabit tliem. It
is also a gendered landscape, which stressed access to shops for the
'womenfolk' inhabiting man-less daytime streets, a Town Centre as a place for
respectable feminine display, and neighbourhood shopping centres as places
where aprons and even curlers might do.
There were other means of securing 'good city' objectives. In the Town
Centre, civic buildings were separated from shops, so that their monumental
expression of civic virtue would not disappear in the hubbub of retail trade:
[C]are must be taken to ensure that the desirable hustle and bustle of the shopping mall
is not carried into the area set aside for civic buildings. It is hoped to achieve this by
incorporating in the plan at the eastern end of the principal shopping mall a large open
garden area— a type of "village green"— around which, on the sides remote from the
shops, the civic and cultural life of the community can be carried on in relatively
peaceful surroundings.^^
In addition, open space and wide roads made for vistas of sweep and serenity
opposed to the cluttered, narrowed perspectives of the slum. Wide roads also
separated the houses, dividing them into pockets of individual domestic
retreats. This also prevented people using the street for the wrong purposes,
whether play, or conversation, or work. A street full of cars with the people
behind doors is a triumph for the planner's vision of everything in its place.
Consultants in the 1970s noted that Elizabeth's roads "appear to be
unnecessarily wide with median planting strips which look pleasant, but cannot
be used."'^^ They were not meant to be used: it was the improper use of such
pleasant space that had made new towns necessary in the first place.
Relative to other Australian developments in the postwar period, the Trust
clearly did some things better. Perhaps learning from its own mistakes at
Salisbury North, an outer suburban rental estate already stigmatised as a home
for deserted wives in the mid-1950s, the Trust tried to make Elizabeth a well-
serviced and mixed community. The provision of services and facilities,
especially open space, underground electricity, roads and accessible small
shops was considerably better than in other outer suburbs. Hugh Stretton could
reasonably claim in 1975 that among such places, "Elizabeth is certainly the
country's best [and] certainly lives above the line that divides the tolerable
from the unforgiveable".'^^
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And residents recognised how far Elizabeth, with its decent houses, its parks
and its gardens, was much better than what most had ever known before. It
was decent housing and the chance of work that drew people to the new town
in the first place Planning a town of jobs and houses is not the problem. Nor
is the act of planning per se to be condemned. But if people wanted decent
accommodation, they did not therefore want or deserve planning based on the
bargain of expertise: that what is provided must be used in ways which Justify
its provision and confirm the assumptions of the providers. In a very real
sense, the Trust's commitment to its creation was based on the expectation of
model behaviour for a model town, even if what that behaviour would be and
how design would enforce it remained vague. If Elizabeth was at first
relatively successful, this did not mean either that the assumptions written into
its making were proved, or that the bargain of expertise was Justified.
These were, after all, ominous expectations. The paradoxical idea that a model
town would both need and create model inhabitants is evident in much of the
literature of planning in the twentieth century. Certainly, Australian planners
were not short of ideas about the grand outcomes of model communities. Their
ameliorative and redistributive aims also should not be doubted. But building a
model community in practice meant retreating further and further from any
significant redistribution of power and resources, closer and closer to technical
expertise and functionalism. ^5 In particular, locating the guarantee for a
successful implementation of the planners' goals proved difficult. To define
success at Elizabeth, the Trust moved, unsteadily, from relying on design, to
relying on residents, to relying on those who employed them. At first, it
expected that migrants to the new town would come from those groups who
most wanted housing: white collar workers and the respectable working class.
Both could be imagined as at least neat and clean, and unlikely to sabotage the
design. But one could trust even those residents only insofar as the community
incorporated unequal access to superior accommodation in line with unequal
positions in the structure of income and resources. Maintaining necessary
social divisions meant endorsing an established (and thoroughly British)
hierarchy of deference and influence within the new town.
But even with planned hierarchy, relying on the residents posed certain
problems. Ensuring model tenants and model home-buyers raised issues of
social control and paternalism that Ramsay and others found unpalatable. They
did insist on a number of occasions that Elizabeth was not intended for the
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indigent poor and would be no ”shanty-town”26 At a conference in 1966
,
Ramsay mused on the problem at greater length:
There seems to be, and I think it would be true in all countries, a special sort of
floating population, some of whom are quite estimable people, and many are not: the
real drifters. A new factory is announced to extract a mineral or develop something and
the word gets around that big money is to be made. In come these people who have
caravans, tents, a lot of children, dogs and all sorts of things; they arrive in the town
and I’m afraid bring many problems with them. The first wave of such people come
into your new houses and believe me it is not all beer and skittles collecting the rent
and keeping the houses in good trim.^^
So some sort of exclusion was necessary. But Ramsay did not see the Trust as
some kind of big brother. He warned at the beginning against "undue
paternalism" in the collection of rents or the supervision of mortgages.'^^ Like
any other housing agency, the Trust had its estates officers, its rent collectors
and its inspectors who submitted reports on tenants and encouraged them to
keep houses in good order. Unlike others, perhaps, the Trust had the happy
knack of appointing people — especially women — to these positions who had
some understanding for their clients and a commitment to aiding as well as
policing. The Trust lent tenants tools for gardening and home maintenance, did
not evict if rent was one week late, and generally acted out the benevolent half
of the paternalist ethic. Beyond keeping out urban gypsies, the Trust had
neither the desire nor the means to engage in full-blown social selection.
Planners could, of course, fall back on the entrenchment of social stratification
through house building and pricing policy. Social leadership would then occur
naturally’. One of the supposed gains of social mix, after all, was that middle-
class home-owners would act as leaders and instigators because of their
’natural’ skills in such areas. Or leadership might be generated by cajoling
churches and other institutions to set up community-centering facilities. The
Trust also tried to select those who would act as leaders by letting shops in
local shopping centres to ’community-minded’ people, for instance.^^ Women,
too, were expected to sally forth from the domestic retreat to shop, talk, plan
and integrate. Yet somehow leadership did not emerge in this way. Internal
divisions of class, gender and neighbourhood did not simply match those
assumed in the plan. Providing for leaders with middle-class skills and
interests in a working-class town proved rather difficult, especially because the
first imperative of many middle-class newcomers was to establish as much
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distance as possible from renters and factory workers in space, in social
contacts and in their relationship with the Trust. But if a pepper-and-salt
sprinkling of middle-class social expertise did not work, the assumptions of the
new town model provided precious few alternative means of explaining or
directing community leadership. If middle-class people didn't do it, who
could? And if it wasn't done, then how was Elizabeth to become and remain a
model community? How would working-class residents learn to adapt their
social and spatial habits? A village-like community needed its squire. And the
emergence of problems with unemployed youth, delinquency, vandalism and
deteriorating standards of home upkeep seemed to confirm that the hierarchy
of deference wasn't working.
Lacking sufficient evidence of middle class leadership activity at the
neighbourhood level, the Trust increasingly looked instead to another measure
of community success: economic growth. Murky social and psychological
outcomes like integration remained an important part of new town rationale.
In Elizabeth, as in Stevenage or Crawley, planners always assumed they were
constructing the good city, not just a new estate. The good city, if planned
properly, could still produce valued social outcomes — social mix,
neighbourhood community, and village-like social relationships — and an
orderly use of space unlike the chaos of slum or sprawl. Yet such outcomes
were hard to define, let alone measure. What would prove 'integration'? How
did you measure 'village-like' or 'social mix'? But on one thing, measurements
could be made. The increments of new factories, extra jobs, or new
applications for relocation offered hard evidence and a visible economic
outcome of the new town experiment. It also satisfied the demands of the
'Playford Plan' for a richer South Australia. If Elizabeth was an economic
success, then somehow the social goals of new town planning would follow in
train.
As in Britain, this meant locating a vigour and a morality in industrial
capitalism that would assure a harmonious as well as profitable industrial
landscape. Understanding the needs of such enterprises became an increasingly
vital part of the Trust's role as a development agency. Capital was not expected
to be able to perform on its own, or even to perform properly without
adequate guidance. Like British new town advocates, the Trust readily
criticised private capital for its past failures and its apparent inability to cope
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with the spirit of planning. In particular, the Trust was not going to build a
one-employer or one-industry 'company* town:
My own philosophy here is clear and distinct, "Milltown", the town that has one
industry, should be avoided like the plague if at all possible.. .[T]here are still those
giants of industry who seem to yearn to build a milltown if they can. Possibly the
reason is psychological— they yearn for a father-image; well we at the Housing Trust
will avoid being associated with such a town unless the geographical factors make
such development inevitable...Even if the company has enough capital to [provide
houses] it is undesirable that the company should own too many of the houses. Tying
a house to a job is generally undesirable— both for the man and for the company
too.^^
Ramsay was also frustrated by the way that industrial capital tended to over-
develop certain sites without adequate thought to planning:
Industrialists are conservative people, and if there are industries within five or ten
miles they will feel much more at home than seeming to go out into the absolute
wilderness. If I might put in an aside— it remains a wonder to me the way
industrialists herd into concentrated areas far beyond the capacity of the nearby
housing areas to provide the labour which they want. Their labour, therefore, either
has long and costly daily journeys or else they bid labour away from one another by
over-award payments.^^
Illogical, herd-like capital was not the capital for a model town. What was
needed was a vigorous and efficient capital which would accept and promote
the physical and social goals of the new town and see the benefits of expert
planning. There would be no private paternalism dominating this landscape.
The Trust's planners rejected zoning — realistically appraising the likelihood
of local councils controlling multinational employers — as well as the British
principle of the public developer maintaining freehold control over all sites.
Instead, they settled for the method of selling land "but so encumbering the
title with a caveat and an option for the Trust to repurchase the land if it be
used for any other purposes than that for which it has been sold, that the
purchaser would find it very difficult to do other than use it for its original
purchase. "82 With this guarantee, the Trust looked forward with confidence to
a model town of model industry.
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1-rom the very beginning, however, the Trust was engaged in minor and major
disputes with land purchasers about what the caveats actually meant. It also
found itself building and extending factories to changing specifications and
having to prod industrialists into action. A self-disciplining capital proved
rather more elusive than they assumed. In addition, they expected industrial
capital to lead the way, ignoring other kinds of capital and potential
differences between large and small plants or multinational and local
companies. De.spite these frustrations, the Trust's interpretation of its model
community had decisively shifted. One of the les.sons planners learned from
their grand tour of British new towns was the need for a flexible and friendly
approach to industry. Criticisms of private firms were put aside, or raised at
board meetings but not in public. Actually forcing industry to do its bit in
securing the model conflicted with the need to sell factory sites quickly.
Accordingly, the Trust began to expect that private capital, if nudged in the
right direction, would not actually do anything to sabotage the plan. Economic
success alone could produce valued social outcomes if the design rules for
housing and community development were maintained. Kevin Phillips, the
'frust's main man in wooing industrialists from Adelaide, the East and
overseas, reminded planners that bargains had to be struck:
It has often been said that industry must conform to the general pattern for the town,
but I would suggest that where anyone is inducing a mtmufacturer to take a site away
from an area of his natural inclination, the authority involved must be prepared to make
every concession and provide a plan which is very flexible, indeed. This, of course,
imposes difficulties in the way of service departments and all branches of planning,
but until the authority can choose from a large number of manufacturers and enterprise
for location, a flexible plan will be part of its inducement.
Selling the landscape became the primary goal. Elizabeth would become and
remain a model community by attracting and holding on to private capital.
ITiis at least was a strategy that satisfied the planners' need for activism, for
getting out and selling their master plan. And pinning their hopes on efficient
and rational private enterprise offered a much less complicated fulfillment of
the plan than building neighbourhood communities, finding the tenants to lead
them, and making sure that you got social mix without losing necessary social
distinctions. Securing major employers — especially General Motors-Holden
— made it easier to explain the purposes of a productive model community
and to justify planning activism where it trod on the toes of other property
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interests. Industry sensed the change of mood. The secretary of the South
Australian Chamber of Manufacturers, listing what industry expected from
town planners, noted his appreciation of the re-thinking of Elizabeth:
In the original plans for Elizabeth, the industrial areas were located on the extreme
south of the City, on the north-west and across the railway line (without any proposals
as to housing on that side of the railway line in the immediate future) and a small area
impossible to serve by railway in the north-east corner of the town. In other words,
industry in Elizabeth was to be treated like the leper and kept outside the city wall.
Fortunately, the very substantial expense of land around, and the demands for an
Elizabeth larger than originally intended, will cause houses to surround the industrial
areas...Town Planning, the same as management, must have a very strong
commonsense ingredient if the best interests of the community are to be served.^
Industry wanted "contented work people" and "community facilities", paid for
by the public. xhe Trust increasingly expected to provide just that.
Planning for uplift was not abandoned. Design for a City provided stylized
images of clean and angular shopping malls and green spaces, with stick
figures invariably sporting a baby carriage, and the same visual images would
reappear during the 1960s. The social outcomes expected of the model town
remained fairly intact. Stuart Hart's idea that a city of proud and self-
identifying neighbourhoods had come into being was mirrored in the Trust's
1962 Annual Report, which confidently asserted that the town "is rapidly
acquiring a lived-in look whilst the inhabitants have become a community.
In the same year, the Town Planning Committee of South Australia, restated
the older village-city comparisons and made its assessment of Elizabeth:
In Australia the lack of community interest and the loneliness found in many suburban
areas contrasts sharply with the civic pride, neighbourliness and "sense of belonging"
found in smaller country towns...The new town of Elizabeth, with its separate
neighbourhoods, town centre and balanced provision of shops, open spaces,
industries and community facilities, is designed to provide the type of environment
most nearly approaching the needs of the community. Although it is too early to be
sure, there are signs that this object is being achieved.^”^
ITe residents had apparently been transformed. The migrants and workers
who peopled Elizabeth had, through the good offices of the planners and
employers, become a community. In this simple and efficient determinism, the
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conflict and disorder of tlie demon city had passed without any need for undue
paternalism or intervention in the natural piocesses of human life.
Yet this new town, like all the others, rested on a series of major and most
unlikely ifs concerning the results of good design.«« In particular, it assumed
that the problem of the city in a capitalist society was its spatial, not its
economic, relationships. Solving the problem of improper uses of space and
constructing a bargain of good behaviour for redistributive expertise would
mean an integrated, happy and efficient city. Planners also assumed that their
plans had a real hold over their objects; that somehow what was planned would
happen as long as the planning was good enough.^^ Under the pressure of
proving and measuring poorly conceived outcomes, Elizabeth’s planners
shifted their reliance from the skilful encouragement of community by design,
to attempts to select residents who could create community, and finally to
carefully and flexibly selling the landscape, in the hope that the new town was
already a community or would become one if it attracted the right kind of
industry. And so they constructed one last shaky totality: a city of perpetual
profit.
4P*Our ^'greatest venture and most rewarding task^*: Elizabeth
in 1960^^
Tlie planning of Elizabeth rested on a vision of new town life and the proper
arrangement of urban space. It was a plan with moral as well as economic
purposes. True, the Trust did better than other Australian housing authorities
in providing decent and relatively cheap housing, influencing land prices,
organising community facilities and holding back purely speculative urban
sprawl. ITiese were significant achievements, to be defended against those who
would return Australian cities to the tender mercies of land speculators or
working-class barrack builders.^^
Of course, there were criticisms of Elizabeth as a specific project. Gilbert
Herbert mildly chided the Trust for its social and spatial conservatism and
warned of the danger of "a built-in obsolescence of ideas" in 1963.^^ Yencken
Tract Consultants noted that in 1971 that "it has sometimes been assumed that
Elizabeth is no better than an English working class ghetto with social
problems of commensurate order." Their reply, that "[i]t would be more
accurate to suggest that within the context of these special problems the social
30
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achievements at Elizabeth have been considerable
",
is not exactly brimming
with enthusiasm. Earlier, Mackenzie had rather unkindly referred to the
town as "this urban pancake" in an otherwise laudatory article in a British
town planning journal, while in 1973, the consultation group brought together
by Australian Frontier agreed that "Elizabeth was imperfect as a model" for
the proposed new town of Monarto.^^
Generally, though, the Trust kept its defenders, who moved with it (or, in the
case of Stretton, into it). Having mastered the formidable organisational
problems of operational planning, the Trust itself moved on to new projects:
suburban developments at Noarlunga, inner urban reclamation at Hackney,
inner city revitalization at the Jam Factory, and, later, the strategic provision
of housing for historically ill-housed groups like homeless youth. The Trust
developed and changed. It found flexible and sensible solutions to the housing
problems on its own turf, in part because it listened to its clients and its critics.
But what was happening to the Trust's "greatest venture"? Built as a new town
in the British mould, Elizabeth inherited not just the spatial concepts and
economic objectives of that model, but also its tenuous assumptions.
Throughout the 1960s, these assumptions looked more and more threadbare as
those who used the landscape created competing Elizabeths within the same
space. Within the model city there emerged different constructions of the site:
an Elizabeth of detached home-owners opposed to an Elizabeth of double-unit
tenants; a dormitory Elizabeth and a self-sufficient Elizabeth; a workers'
Elizabeth of worksites and an employers' Elizabeth of sites of profit; a man's
Elizabeth of cars, pubs and factories and a woman's Elizabeth of streets,
informal neighbourhoods and intermittent work. The model landscape
splintered into different and conflicting conceptions of what the town was and
who it was for. On the one site emerged socially discontinuous spaces based on
varied commonalities of experience, different relationships with different
orders of multinational, national and local capital, stratified residence patterns,
and the lived divisions of gender, age, class and respectability.
This is precisely what the new town model's assumptions could not
countenance: that residents, and in particular working-class residents, were
spatially and socially creative. Planners did not allow that a properly planned
space could be used in ways which threatened the integrity and social
objectives of planning or could provide residents with the material and
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ideological base for local social practices and local investments in particular
organizations of space. Homeowners tried to secure their advantages against
renters and to dominate local government. Elizabeth’s youth occupied and
vandalised public space. Residents set up small businesses in their backyards.
Working women commuted to Adelaide. Local workers disputed with factory
managers. Shoppers skipped the local community centres to head for the big
stores in the Town Centre. Planners were curiously unable to imagine how
their landscape might be appropriated and used by others, even organized and
defended against their intentions.^^^
Having constructed working-class or even capitalist uses of urban space as the
problem, simply providing space could not satisfy the bargain of expertise.
Interventionist and redistributive practice, however well-intentioned, needs the
return of good behaviour to justify the effort and the cost. During the boom of
the 1960s, partly because of the genuine redistributive efforts of the Housing
Trust, working-class residents were able to shape the landscape and use the site
in their own interests and in their own ways. With abundant work and good
wages, at least for men, strengthening the residents' ability to display and
defend their prosperity and respectability, the town could be a success in spite
of its contradictions. With the downturn of the 1970s, these contradictions
would come into full force, undermining a fragile working-class landscape,
shattering the confidence of the planners and fatally compromising the bargain
of expertise. The Elizabeths made by residents had no real power beyond what
they could win from the struggle to distribute the gains of long-boom
prosperity. With economic crisis, their Elizabeths would be devalued and
eventually turned against them, as proof of their inability to use their bounty
properly. What was important was not that those who built Elizabeth failed to
turn residents into model citizens, nor even that they made the attempt. But in
building the town with that expectation, they built in a logic of reliance,
retreat, even abandonment. They invited an interpretation of problems which
blames the residents: that Elizabeth was a worthy project undone by those who
could not or would not fulfill their end of the bargain of expertise, or that the
working-class and the welfare poor will always overcome good design.
If the new town depended on a certain use of space by residents, it was also
crucially dependent upon the loyalty of capital to the model landscape. Surely
employers, once given profitable and harmonious environments, would have
no reason to ever abandon or under-utilise landscapes so committed to
securing their investments. The Trust increasingly focussed on the industrial
side of planning: securing tenants for industrial sites, building factories,
diverting roads and laying on railroad spurs, planning more housing for
workers. The creation and securing of local labour markets were major
achievements. The Trust also helped large retailers penetrate a growing
market for goods and services. But one of the consequences of the Trust's
reliance on local Jobs and secure employers was an increased dependence on
the loyalty of those employers to this particular landscape. One of the things
the Trust took from the British new town model was the idea that capital,
given encouragement, did contain a morality beyond profit; that there could be
a good city, good spatial relationships, without any interventions in production
and economic relationships. Certainly, the economic boom which cemented
working-class power in the landscape also guaranteed a degree of capitalist
loyalty to sites providing profit, even with escalating industrial unrest during
the early 1960s. Yet their loyalty was to their Elizabeths, their interpretations
of the purposes of working-class communities. The boom times produced a
false sense of confidence that the industrialists were indeed good capitalist
citizens, committed to the landscape and to the social objectives of the plan.
By the 1970s, industrial firms large and small would be struggling to free
themselves from this particular 'spatial fix', this particular geography of
accumulation. They would begin the search for new and more profitable
localities than the built environments and unionised communities of the long
boom. Moreover, the competition between different kinds of capital to secure
and advance their investments in the landscape — a competition the Trust had
never expected — intensified. Job loss and relocation threatened land and real
estate values, retail markets, mortgages and debt payments. As Elizabeth
declined, differently empowered groups battled to deliver the costs of
devaluation onto other players in the urban process: to abandon what they
could, privatize the bits that could turn a profit, attract subsidies to stay in
place. As those who could retreated into private estates or new and better
public housing outside Elizabeth, the people left behind were those who had
always been ruled out of participating in working-class respectability or
ownership by their gender, their age, their access to work or 'male' wages.
And in the competitive city of specialized services and labour markets,
gentrification and technology parks, multifunction outers and heritaged inners,
it is hard to see a future for landscapes like Elizabeth.^^
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But when things went wrong, there was nothing in the derived model to either
explain the way employers drew away from the landscape or to suggest ways
the developing authority could defend and protect their own investments in the
model community, let alone the created civil spaces of the residents. The
power of Elizabeth's makers was a structured and temporary one, which relied
upon those with economic and political muscle accepting their authority to
plan. The Trust's control over space was uneven, to say the least. So was its
control over the organization and reproduction of spatial and social
relationships, especially where it had given freehold to private individuals or
companies. A retreat from commitment on their part undermined the plan in
ways that could not be repaired. In Britain, new towns were expected to
become harder, leaner places and to "have a flexible response to market
conditions" sadly lacking in the 'levelling' projects of over-enthusiastic social
reconstructionists. The Trust travelled less willingly down the road to the
free market, but it could not in the end save its Elizabeth from
'rationalization'.
In a way, though, the Trust was beginning to doubt its expertise well before
economic crisis threatened the community. One Trust officer, reporting on the
London Office of the Housing Trust, suggested that a major problem is
"failure in London to describe the differences between an English New Town
and Elizabeth". What the distinction was, of course, had never really been
articulated by the Trust itself, beyond some vague sense that Elizabeth was an
"Australian" community. What Phillips might have intended the London Office
to tell prospective migrants is not described. But it does suggest some retreat
from the idea the British new towns, already being criticised as economic and
social failures, were adequate models for Elizabeth.
More serious for the Trust were any accusations that its policies were not
working, especially its provision of jobs and attraction of employers. Hence
Cartledge and Ramsay's vigorous response to newspaper articles or
parliamentary questions which threatened to create bad publicity. But the Trust
was itself worried about the balance ot jobs, about the ability or willingness of
employers to confonn to planning goals, and about the future of the model
town. A 1957 memo trom W.R.Hill paints a somewhat pessimistic picture,
albeit in urging a factory construction programme:
Privately owned manufacturing industry at Elizabeth employs 30 persons, i.e. at the
Pinnock Manufacturing Co. Pty. Ltd. These people are working so hard that the
34
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Adelaide Chamber of Commerce recently sought details of the company's incentive
scheme. There isn't one. Other people are constantly enquiring for work at the factory
and offering their services for as much as £2 per week below current wage rates.
Some local labour is employed by the Trust's building contractors in the area. Work
prospects for juniors are very poor and 350 women are registered for work at the local
Labour Office. It has been said that nearly half of the population of Elizabeth is
employed outside the town, mostly in the metropolitan area of Adelaide. In short, the
rapidly growing population of the town and the industrial expansion in the area are
completely out of balance. The development of the General Motors-Holden's site will
do little to correct this position. Employees of General Motors-Holden at present
working at the Woodville plant will come to Elizabeth each day, probably by special
train. Those who tire of the daily Journey will seek houses at Elizabeth and a limited
number with long service leave or other staff benefits, and who can obtain other
employment, may resign. But overall the growth of General Motors-Holden at
Elizabeth will absorb very little local labour during the years immediately following the
development of tliis Company. Experience has shown that it is not difficult to sell
industrial sites at Elizabeth. The problem is to sell land which will be developed within
a reasonable time and thus provide employment for the existing workforce which is
swelling under the joint impact of immigration and the increasing number of children
leaving secondary school.
In August 1961, W.Phillips from the Architect's Section, reporting on his trip
to England and Europe, observed "[i]t is interesting to note that some of the
new towns were having similar problems to those the Trust is experiencing at
Elizabeth, namely the juvenile vandal and the estb. of factories and businesses
to employ large numbers of people. In Elizabeth, or in Stevenage,
unauthorised and unexpected uses of space by residents and the wavering
commitment of a supposedly loyal capital created problems that threatened to
stretch the plan beyond breaking point.
Within a few years of its founding, then, Elizabeth was beginning to worry its
advocates and its planners. They began to mistrust their own technical
solutions. Unable to conceive of others or of any significant reinteipretation of
expertise, the Trust began to distance itself, unevenly, slowly, from its greatest
venture. It came to rely more and more on the commitment and loyalty of
employers and less and less on the character of the residents. So long as the
majority of the residents could be interpreted as behaving well within the
bargain of expertise, Elizabeth could remain a model community and a place
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to praise. But any threat to their ability to behave, most obviously through the
erosion of their prosperity, was also a threat to the Trust's interpretation and
appreciation of its venture. Most important, the plan — partial and derivative
as it was — failed as a determinism. The Trust could not guarantee its own
construction of the landscape, let alone the constructions of its tenants and
mortgagees, llieir Elizabeths, their personal and collective investments in the
outer suburban landscape, would be the first to fall.
The history of Elizabeth measures the failures of new town ideology as a
strategy for a fairer urban society, not just the difficulty of implementing it in
Australia. But the real message of Elizabeth is not necessarily about the Trust,
or even about new town planning as a deeply flawed practice. In time, the
history of Elizabeth would become the history of a working-class and migrant
community on the urban fringe, exposed by its industrial structure to the
collapse of the long boom, in a country peculiarly dependent on the whims of
multinational capital. Its history would not turn on planning, but on who or
what has power in the urban landscape. This is the memory and the history
which are submerged and made invisible by 'relative success', 'design flaws',
'working-class suburb', or 'welfare ghetto'. The real message of Elizabeth is
not what went wrong with planning, but what happens to good intentions and
model communities in a society which must always push the costs of eventual
crisis onto those with the fewest resources, whether they live in a new town or
an old slum.
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